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Input-matching is a keymechanismbywhich animals optimally distribute themselves across habitats tomaximize net gains basedon the
changing input values of food supply rate and competition. To examine the neural systems that underlie this rule in humans, we created
a continuous-input foraging taskwhere subjects had to decide to stay or switch between twohabitats presented on the left and right of the
screen. The subject’s decision to stay or switchwas based on changing input values of reward-token supply rate and competition density.
High density of competition or low-reward token ratewas associatedwith decreased chance of winning. Therefore, subjects attempted to
maximize their gains by switching to habitats that possessed low competition density and higher token rate. When it was increasingly
disadvantageous to be in a habitat, we observed increased activity in brain regions that underlie preparatorymotor actions, including the
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the supplementary motor area, as well as the insula, which we speculate may be involved in the
conscious urge to switch habitats. Conversely, being in an advantageous habitat is associatedwith activity in the reward systems, namely
the striatum and medial prefrontal cortex. Moreover, amygdala and dorsal putamen activity steered interindividual preferences in
competition avoidance and pursuing reward. Our results suggest that input-matching decisions are made as a net function of activity in
a distributed set of neural systems. Furthermore, we speculate that switching behaviors are related to individual differences in compe-
tition avoidance and reward drive.
Introduction
A key inference of Ideal Free-Distribution Theory is that foragers
geographically distribute themselves in relation to the proportion
of food available and to the density of competition (Fretwell and
Lucas, 1969). This distribution is expressed in the Simplest Input-
Matching Rule where, if Habitat A contains more food and less
competition than Habitat B, Habitat A will be the preferred loca-
tion. Although some theorists argue whether the input-matching
rule is an evolutionarily stable strategy (Kennedy and Gray,
1993), pioneering work from behavioral ecology has shown it to
be pervasive across a variety of species from invertebrates to hu-
mans (Fretwell and Lucas, 1969; Fretwell, 1972). In explaining
some of these inconsistent results, some argue that many input-
matching models fail to consider abiotic variables and are indif-
ferent to the subjective weight placed on avoiding competition
and seeking reward. Humans, in particular, may either shirk
competition (Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012) or be biased toward
reward signals when pursuing profitable habitats. To date, no
study has examined the neural substrates of continuous input
matching in relation to the density of competition (C) and reward
rate (R), nor how idiosyncratic preferences based on changing
input weights of C and R spur habitat switching.
Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we
scanned volunteers as they played a continuous-input foraging
task (Fig. 1A). The subject’s goal was to acquire asmany tokens as
possible by switching between two habitats to minimize C and
compete for tokens with the highest supply rate (R). In both
habitats, tokens were presented in four shades—light, medium,
dark gray, and black—each indicating the frequency of supply
rate (i.e., 1–4 Hz; Fig. 1B). In addition, red dots also appeared in
both habitats and were representative of online competitors
against whom the subjects believed they were competing in real
time. Up to six subjects competed for tokens (Fig. 1C) and were
each instructed to press a response button as soon as a token
appeared in their habitat. Subjects who responded fastest won the
tokens. Tokens were exchanged for money at the end of the
experiment.
We parametrically examined brain activity associated with in-
put matching both as a function of when competitors entered or
left the volunteer’s habitat (changes in C) and of varying reward
supply rate (R). We had two main predictions. We first hypoth-
esized that, as it becomes increasingly disadvantageous to be in
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the current habitat (i.e., linear increases in C and decreased R),
there would be increased activity in brain regions associated with
preparatorymotor urges including primarymotor areas, anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), and the insula. Conversely, as the current
habitat becomes increasingly advantageous, there would be aug-
mented activity in basal ganglia reward systems. Second, we
wanted to examine individual differences in habitat-switching
behavior. That is, we wanted to learn whether subjects weremore
inclined to switch based on increasing C or on decreasing R.
Materials andMethods
Subjects.Wescanned18volunteers.Allwere right-handed, fluent speakersof
English, and screened for psychiatric or neurological problems. Three were
excluded due to expressing disbelief that they were playing against other
subjectsonline.Thus, the final samplewas15 (8males; age, 25.07.3years).
When subjects arrived at the scanner facility, they were first told that they
would be playing a live online game with a number of other people via the
Cambridge Brain Sciencewebsite (www.cambridgebrainsciences.com). The
study was approved by Cambridgeshire Psychology Research Ethics Com-
mittee. All volunteers provided written informed consent and were paid for
participating.
Paradigm. The continuous-input foraging task is depicted in Figure 1.
Before being placed supine in the MRI, participants were briefed about
the nature of the task. Participants were then presented with a screen
depicting two habitats. The participant was represented by a yellow dot
residing on one of the two habitats. The two habitats also contained one
or more competitors (depicted by red dots). From 1 to 6 competitors
were present in each habitat at any one time and the participant believed
these red dots represented real online participants also playing the task in
real time. The participant’s taskwas to acquire tokens (via a button press)
that appeared in their own habitat before those tokens were acquired by
the competitors in the same habitat. Each token was worth 50 points and
the aim was to amass as many points as possible over the duration of the
task. The tokens were represented by monochrome dots. The tokens
appeared in both habitats so the participant was able to see what token
was in the habitat they are not occupying and also to see how many
competitors were present in that other habitat. At any one time, therewas
never more than a single token appearing in each of the two habitats on
the screen and participants could only harvest tokens in their ownhabitat
(i.e., where the yellow dot resided). To acquire the token once it appeared
in the participant’s own habitat, the participant had to press the response
button faster than any of the competitors in that habitat. Successful
acquisition was depicted by a green halo appearing around the yellow
dot, if the participant won out, or around one of the red dots, if a com-
petitor won out. The token then disappeared from the screen until it was
refreshed. Critically, the tokens varied in the rate at which they were
refreshed. These refresh rates range from 1 to 4 Hz and the refresh rates
were represented by different shades of monochrome token. A light-gray
token refreshed at a supply rate of 4 Hz, medium gray at 3 Hz, dark gray
at 2 Hz, and black at 1 Hz. Being in a habitat that contains a token with a
higher refresh rate increased the chances of token acquisition as more
tokens were available to acquire over time. The key challenge for the
participant therefore was to maximize token acquisition by moving to
the habitat with the tokens with the highest refresh rate and the fewest
competitors. Therefore, the most optimal habitat to occupy was one that
contained only 1 competitor and a 1 Hz black token. To meet this chal-
lenge, participants were able to freely switch between the two habitats
(using left or right key presses) at any time during the task, although there
was a short time cost with each switch.
The foraging conditions were presented in 2 min epochs each sepa-
rated by a 30 s black screen with text showing how many points the
participant had won. Each subject completed 20 epochs totaling 46 min.
Every 8 s, the shade of the monochrome token (and consequently the
refresh rate) in each habitat changed. Similarly, competitors (red dots)
could enter or leave either habitat every 2 s. Consequently, both the
frequency of reward (R, tokens) and the degree of competition (C, com-
petitors) in each habitat was constantly changing, requiring participants
to continuallyweighwhether the best strategywas to stick to their current
habitat (HS) or to switch to the other habitat (HO). Each switch incurred
a 1 s time cost. In reality, R and C were predetermined as was the partic-
ipant’s probability of winning a token during each acquisition opportu-
nity (although they had to press the button to win). At the end of the
experiment, token points were exchanged for money.
Increase the verisimilitude of the competitors. To increase the verisimil-
itude of the competitors, we asked subjects to sign up on the website
www.cambridgebrainsciences.com. Once the subjects signed up, we
showed them some of the experiments and a paper recently published
using data from an online brain-training game (Owen et al., 2010). We
Figure 1. Schematic of the continuous-input foraging task and plots depicting R and C changes over time. A, B, Plots depict frequency in hertz of R (A), which were presented in 8 s blocks, and
C (B) across both habitats over time. Schedules were chosen such that R and C were decorrelated across habitats. C, The task involved the subject trying to acquire as many tokens as possible by
switching between habitats to increase the likelihood of acquiring the tokens and by pressing a button as fast as possible when a token appeared. Subjects, told that speed of response was a factor
in determiningwhich competitorwon the token,were encouraged to press a response button as quickly as possible after a token appeared in their habitat. Competitorswere unknown to each other
and had approximately the same competitive abilities.
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informed them that an e-mail had been sent to all those who had regis-
tered with the website and that a number of these other participants
would come online and play against them while they were having an
fMRI scan.
Questionnaire measures. Following the MRI scan, participants an-
swered a number of questions concerning the task (postscan question-
naire). The rating scale was structured as follows: 1, 2: very slightly or not
at all; 3, 4: a little; 5, 6: moderately; 7, 8: quite a bit; 9, 10: extremely.
Examples of the questions include: “Howmuch attention did you pay to
the tokens changing?” and “How much attention did you pay to the
competitors entering your patch?” The rationale for these postscan ques-
tions was to see whether subjects used explicit strategies to aid in their
decisions to switch habitats.
Image acquisition. MRI scanning was conducted at the Medical Re-
search Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit on a 3-tesla Trio Tim
Magnetic Resonance Imaging scanner (Siemens) by using a head coil
gradient set. Whole-brain data were acquired with echoplanar T2*-
weighted imaging (EPI) sensitive to BOLD signal contrast (48 sagittal
slices; thickness, 3 mm; TR, 2400ms; TE, 30ms; flip angle, 78°; FOV, 192
mm; voxel size, 3 3 3 mm). To provide for equilibration effects, the
first five volumes were discarded. T1-weighted structural images were
acquired at a resolution of 1 1 1 mm.
Image preprocessing. SPM5 software (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) was
used for data analysis. The EPI images were sinc interpolated in time for
correction of slice timing differences and realignment to the first scan by
rigid body transformations to correct for head movements. For each
participant, themean EPI was calculated and examined to guarantee that
none exhibited excessive signal dropout in insula and ventral striatum.
Using linear and nonlinear transformations, and smoothing with a
Gaussian kernel of full-width-half-maximum 8 mm, EPI and structural
images were coregistered and normalized to the T1 standard template in
MNI space [Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)—International
Consortium for BrainMapping]. Global changes were removed by high-
pass temporal filtering with a cutoff of 128 s to remove low-frequency
drifts in signal.
Statistical analysis. After preprocessing, statistical analysis was per-
formed using the general linear model. Analysis was performed to estab-
lish each participant’s voxelwise activation during parametric increases
[i.e., increased R (R1) or increased C (C1)] and decreases [i.e., de-
creasedR (R2) or decreasedC (C2)] inR andC in one’s ownhabitat (self
habitat, HS) compared with the other habitat [other habitat, HO; e.g.,
[HS] (C1  R2)  [HO] (C2  R1)]. For example, C1 in the HS
signifies the parametrically increased activity corresponding with in-
creased number of competitors (1–6) entering the habitat where the
subject’s yellow dot is located. Our regressor matrix included the
following:
1. Amount (i.e., 1– 6) of C in HS
2. Amount of R in HS
3. Amount of C in HO
4. Amount of R in HO
5. Switching habitats
6. Amount of C when the subject decided to press the button to
move to the other habitat based on C present in HS
7. Switching based on R input in HS
8. Switching based on C input in HO
9. Switching based on R input in HO
10. Win token in HS
11. Loss token in HS
Also, six head-motion parameters defined by the realignment procedure
were added to the model as regressors of no interest. Regressors 1–4
represented the parametric changes in input while the subject remained
in the habitat. Regressors 5–8 represented the amount ofC andR in each
habitat when the subject pressed the button to switch habitats. As for
timing, each change in C was defined as an event of 1 s (parametrically
modulated by amount ofC in each patch)with an intertrial interval of 1 s.
Because of the changing frequency from 1 to 4 Hz, we examined the 8 s
event when R changed frequency, with a jitter of 1–4 s between changing
R tokens. Over the full run, both left and right sides of the screen shown
an equal number of competitors and an equal number of reward tokens.
For the switch events (i.e., when the subject pressed the button to switch
habitats), we examined subject responses the 1 s after they entered the
habitat (again, parametrically modulated by the amount of C and R in
both habitats). Activated voxels in each experimental context were iden-
tified using an event-related statistical model representing each of the
regressors in the design matrix, convolved with a canonical hemody-
namic response function andmean-corrected.Multiple linear regression
was then run to generate parameter estimates for each regressor at every
voxel.
We used a statistical threshold of p  0.05 corrected for multiple
spatial comparisons across the whole brain, except for a priori hypothe-
sized regions, and familywise error (FWE) correction was applied. Small
volume correction (SVC) was used on several a priori regions of interest,
including the amygdala, medial orbital frontal cortex, presupplementary
motor area (pre-SMA), motor cortex, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
(PFC), dorsal and ventral caudate, dorsal putamen, bilateral insula, and
dorsal and ventral medial PFC (vmPFC), including the ventral ACC
(Daw et al., 2006; Kennedy et al., 2009;Mobbs et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2010;
Noonan et al., 2012). All SVCswere thresholded at p 0.05FWE-SVC; only
clusters involving 10 or more contiguous voxels were reported.
Model: logistic regression. We applied logistic regression to estimate wc
andwr, two parameters that represented the relative weights that subjects
placed on the number of competitors C and the reward rate R, respec-
tively, when making a switching decision (Table 1). Logistic regression
uses a Bernoulli distribution to model the likelihood of the data. In this








Where tn  {0,1}, 1 means switching, and 0means staying, n is the total
number of trials, and yn is the probability of switching in the nth trial. The





This functionmaps the input between 0 and 1, and is often used tomodel
the probability. In this work, v  wr (r2  r1)  wc (c2  c1)  k. The
standard iterative Newton’s method was applied to find the parameters,
wc and wr, which maximize the likelihood of the switching p(t). Our
implementation of the likelihood function also weighted each sample
differently, because the numbers of switching trials and staying trials
were different. Each sample was weighted by the reciprocal of the sample
size of the belonging group in the objective function.
Table 1. For each subject, the parameter estimates forwc andwr and associated
log-likelihoods showing the goodness of fit (the closer to zero, the better the fit)
Subject wr wc Log-likelihood
1 6.7261 5.0945 58.82
2 3.5859 9.0281 61.10
3 1.4145 3.4053 112.29
4 0.8228 5.4602 93.41
5 2.757 0.9231 110.95
6 1.1919 4.4164 97.23
7 5.0594 4.3368 69.61
8 5.6292 1.5937 58.01
9 6.1645 6.9535 57.74
10 6.7461 6.8012 68.43
11 4.015 5.6779 74.49
12 1.6376 3.2004 132.84
13 11.5011 4.5389 36.08
14 5.4246 4.1447 65.32
15 4.6573 6.4267 71.49
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Results
Behavioral results
We first examined whether the likelihood of switching was based
upon increasingC or decreasingR in the subject’s current (“self”)
habitat (HS) compared with the “other” habitat (HO) and the
influence of individual differences in this behavior. The number
of tokens acquired by participants (mean SD: 5226.7 417.8)
correlated positively with the frequency of switches based on R
(Pearson’s r  0.45; p  0.044, two-tailed), and negatively with
the frequency based on C (r  0.50; p  0.029), showing that
switching based on the optimal balance between C and Rwas the
best strategy. To learn whether subjects used explicit strategies to
aid in their decisions to switch habitats, we examined the subjec-
tive ratings of the degree of attention paid to the competitors’
behavior (assessed via postscan questionnaire) were positively
correlated with switches based on increasing C in the partici-
pant’s own habitat (r  0.61; p  0.008). Subjectively rated at-
tention to R was positively correlated with switching based on
increased R in the other habitat (r 0.46; p 0.041).
fMRI results
Reward systems in the capture of the token
We next examined the neural systems associated with capturing
reward tokens. For the contrast of win (i.e., capturing the token)
minus loss of token (i.e., observing a competitor win the token)
across the whole experiment, we found increased activity in clas-
sic reward areas, including the bilateral ventral striatum [14, 8,
14; Z  4.46; p  0.043, whole-brain corrected for FWE (WB-
CFWE)] andmedial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; 2, 44,2; Z 3.64;
p 0.005 FWE-SVC; Table 2).
Parametric changes in C and R in input
Residing in the disadvantageous habitat. In accordance with the
simplest of input matching models, we next examined neural
activation associated with being in a disadvantageous habitat
[i.e., parametrically increasedC and decreased R in HS compared
with decreased C and increased R in HO ([HS] (C1  R2) 
[HO] (C2  R1)]. To make sure that this activity was not
driven by the increased probability of losing, we exclusively
masked this comparison with the loss–win contrast (p  0.05,
uncorrected mask). We found increased activity in the pre-SMA
(0, 10, 46;Z 2.99; p 0.021FWE-SVC), anterior insula (AI; 34, 24,
4; Z  2.63; p  0.048FWE-SVC), and dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex (dACC; 12, 24, 28; Z  2.84; p  0.030FWE-SVC; Fig. 2A;
Table 3). Finally, this activity was not a result of the motor re-
sponses to switching (i.e., button press).
Residing in the advantageous habitat. Conversely [i.e., [HS]
(C2  R1)  [HO] (C1  R2)], we found that being in the
advantageous habitat resulted in increased activity in the mPFC
and ventral striatum (Fig. 2B; Table 4). Again, we exclusively
masked with the win–loss contrast (p 0.05, uncorrectedmask),
which resulted in significant activity in the posterior dorsal caudate
(18,12, 20; Z 3.47; p 0.036FWE-SVC) extending to the ante-
rior caudate (16, 12, 12; Z  2.84; p  0.030FWE-SVC), ventral
caudate (10, 24,10; Z 3.91; p 0.003FWE-SVC), vmPFC; (14,
58, 10; Z  3.91; p  0.026FWE-SVC), posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC;6,48, 12; Z 4.52; p 0.001FWE-SVC), and intraparietal
sulcus (36, 70, 42; Z  5.61. p  0.0005FWE-SVC). Finally, to
make sure this activitywas not driven by the increased probability of
winning, we examined the correlation between howmuch the sub-
ject won and activity when in the advantageous habitat [i.e., [HS]
(C1R2) [HO] (C2R1)].We found no significant in the
striatum ormPFC (p 0.05, uncorrected).
Residing in the advantageous habitat based on C or R. We next
examined the condition where it was disadvantageous to stay in
HS based on C, but advantageous based on R [i.e., [HS] (C1 
R1)  [HO] (C2  R2)]. Here we found that increased C
density in HS was associated with activity in the left amygdala
(18, 6, 18; Z  3.05; p  0.019FWE-SVC), as well as other
parts of the social brain network, including the mPFC (14, 62,
14; Z  3.81; p 0.0005) and PCC (2,42, 26; Z 3.69; p
0.010FWE-SVC) (Fig. 3A; Table 5). Conversely, when it was advan-
tageous to switch based on increased R in HO [i.e., [HS] (C2
R2) [HO] (C1 R1)], we observed increased activity in the
basal ganglia, specifically the dorsal caudate (24, 14, 18;Z 3.15; p
0.026FWE-SVC), insula (48, 4, 14; Z 2.97; p 0.001), and dorso-
lateral PFC (28, 26, 32; Z 3.95; p 0.0005). This suggests that
changes in C are tracked by activation in the amygdala, while
changes in R are tracked by the dorsal caudate (Fig. 3B; Table 6).
Individual preferences in C and R
We tested this idea further by examining individual preferences
to switch based on C or R for the input-matching contrast (i.e.,
[HS] (C1  R2)  [HO] (C2  R1)). In our model, we
included wc and wr, two weight coefficients that represented the
relative value that subjects placed on the number of competitors
C and the reward rate R, respectively. We looked at all trials (i.e.,
changing R) across all the subjects and found weights that best
predicted switching behavior for each subject. The value of the
current habitat, VHS, was modeled as follows: VHS wrrs wccs.
r1 was the reward rate in the current habitat expressed as a
percentage of the maximum reward rate [i.e., r1  R/4 where
R ranged from1(low) to4 (high)]. c1was thenumberof competitors
in the current habitat expressed as a percentage of the maximum
number of competitors [i.e., c1  C/6 where C ranged from 1
(low) to 6 (high)]. Similarly, the value of the other habitat was
modeled asVHOwrr2wcc2 where r2 and c2 are the percentage
reward rate and competitor numbers in the other habitat. As-
suming one is a rational actor then onewould predict switching if
VHO 	 VHS  k, where k is some constant switching cost. We
estimated the switching cost to be k r1/8c1 as the probability of
winning was approximately r1/c1 and, because trials took 8 s (tri-
als are defined as the period the tokens switched colors) and the
habitat switching took 1 s, expected reward lost during switching
would be one-eighth of that amount. It is assumed that the prob-
ability of switching correlates positively with the difference be-
tween VHO and VHS  k. When VHO  (VHS  k) is large, the
subject is more likely to switch. We modeled this problem by
logistic regression (Bishop, 2006) and estimated the two coeffi-
cients bymaximizing the likelihood of switching according to the
following equation: p(switch) f[VHO (VHS k)] f(wrr2
wcc2wrr1wcc1 k) f[wr(r2 r1) wc(c2 c1) k], here
f(x) is the logistic function, which models the probability of
switching. Using these coefficients as group-level regressors, we
found that the amygdala (26,2,26; Z 2.86; p 0.035FWE-
SVC; Fig. 3C; Table 7) positively correlated with the amount of rela-
tive weight a subject assigned to C compared with the R when
switching (i.e.,wcwr) (Fig. 3D).Conversely, dorsolateral putamen
Table 2. Winning tokens
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z value p value
Ventral striatum 14 8 14 4.46 0.043a
mPFC 22 44 2 3.64 0.0005b
aWhole-brain corrected.
bRegions small volume corrected at p 0.05 FWE with a 10 mm sphere.
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activity (22, 0, 18; Z 2.88; p 0.048FWE-
SVC), dACC (14, 36, 16; Z  3.15; p 
0.001), andventral tegmental area (14,20,
16; Z 2.73; p 0.003) correlated with
the amount of relative weight a subject as-
signed to R compared withC (i.e.,wrwc)
(Fig. 3E; Table 8). We finally wanted to see
whether activity in amygdala and putamen
were confounded with the amount of to-
kens acquired.We foundno significant cor-
relation with either of these regions (p 	
0.05, uncorrected).
Discussion
We demonstrate that when it is increas-
ingly disadvantageous to be in a given
habitat compared with another more ad-
vantageous location, BOLD signal was in-
creased in a basic set of neural systems
involved in preparatory motor responses
and possibly urges to switch location. The
pre-SMA notably becomes more active
during motor preparation and action se-
lection (Romo and Schultz, 1990). For ex-
ample, cells in the pre-SMAmay provide a
link between reward expectancy and mo-
tor execution (Scangos and Stuphorn, 2010). Likewise, the insula,
which is connected to the pre-SMA in humans (Johansen-Berg et
al., 2004), may also relate to errors that should drive a change in
behavior (Klein et al., 2007).
Our dACC activity is also intriguing given its involvement in
behavioral adjustment, rewardmonitoring, and encoding of cost
(Cohen et al., 2007). Indeed, single-cell recordings show that
firing rate in macaque dACC predicts patch leaving during a
reward foraging task (Hayden et al., 2011). In humans, the dACC
may be involved in the cost of foraging or the average value of the
foraging environment (Kolling et al., 2012). The dACC is unlikely
to act in isolation and activity in these interconnected neural
systems could be associated with either the negative value associ-
ated with staying in the disadvantageous habitat or the drive to
switch to the advantageous habitat (Hayden et al., 2011). Impor-
tantly, we also found activity in the AI, a region commonly coacti-
vatedwith thedACC(Craig, 2009).Given that theAI is implicated in
a number of operations, it is difficult to state what role it plays in the
current experiment. However, the AI has been implicated in
decision-making, interoception, awareness, andurgesormotivation
to act (Craig, 2009).Therefore, coactivationof this regionwithother
frontal regions, including dACC, has previously been reported in
other situations, for example when errors occur, that indicate that a
change inbehavior isneeded (Klein et al., 2007,Noonanet al., 2012).
Keeping track of advantageous habitats is presumably critical
in stay-or-switch decisions. We found that being in the advanta-
geous habitat was associated with increased activity in themPFC.
Research in humans and other animals shows that the mPFC is
critical to learning primary and secondary rewards (Chib et al.,
2009) and lesions to vmPFCs of nonhumanprimates significantly
impair reward-guided selection of action (Noonan et al., 2012),
which in our study is perhaps analogous to staying in the current
advantageous habitat. The mPFC and ventral caudate are both
also implicated in value-based exploitative decision-making
(Daw et al., 2006), supporting speculation that activity in both
regions would increase when exploiting an advantageous habitat.
The mPFC is highly connected to the ventral caudate and dorsal
caudate, regions involved in encoding reward value and activated
to increasing amounts of reward (Delgado et al., 2003). Indeed,
the dorsal caudate has been shown to bias animals to collect
rewards and, in turn, may invigorate flexible goal-related actions
(Kimchi et al., 2009).
Amygdala activity occurred both (1) when it was increasingly
disadvantageous to stay in the habitat based on the increasing
density of C (Fig. 3A) and (2) when making a switching decision
based on the number of competitors compared with the reward
rate (Fig. 3D). This supports the suggestion that the amygdala
mediates complex social strategies that characterize competitive
behaviors (Silk, 2007). For example, lesions to the primate
amygdala have dramatic effects on social interaction and status
(Kling, 1972), including socially disinhibited behavior (Amaral,
2002). In humans, the amygdala has been shown to relate to
Figure 2. Parametric analysis of brain activation associatedwith changing competition ( C) and reward frequency (R).A, dACC,
AI, dorsal premotor cortex (PMd), and pre-SMA activity when C increased and R decreased in the subject’s own habitat (HS)
compared with the other habitat (HO). B, vmPFC, ventral caudate, and dorsal caudate when C decreased and R increased in HS
relative to HO. This suggests that preparatory motor areas come online more when it is disadvantageous to be in the HS while
staying in HS due to low C and high R activates the mPFC and ventral caudate.
Table 3. Parametric changes in C R input; residing in the increasingly
disadvantageous habitat
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z value p value
Pre-SMA 0 10 46 4.21 0.021a
AI 34 24 4 2.63 0.048a
dACC 12 24 28 2.84 0.030a
aRegions small volume corrected at p 0.05 FWE with a 10 mm sphere.
Table 4. Parametric changes in C R input; residing in the increasingly
advantageous habitat
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z value p value
Posterior caudate 18 12 20 3.87 0.036b
vmPFC 14 58 10 3.91 0.026b
Anterior caudate 16 12 12 2.84 0.030b
Ventral caudate 10 24 10 3.91 0.003b
PCC 6 48 12 4.25 0.001b
Intraparietal sulcus 36 70 42 5.61 0.005a
Cerebellum 20 84 40 5.72 0.005a
Visual cortex 24 98 4 5.31 0.005a
aWhole-brain corrected.
bRegions small volume corrected at p 0.05 FWE with a 8 mm sphere.
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keeping track of social relationships and attention to social cues
(Adolphs et al., 1998). It is important to note the amygdala is also
associated with fear and anxiety (Bishop et al., 2004;Mobbs et al.,
2010). However, we found no correlation between trait anxiety
scores and amygdala activity, suggesting that this region is not
just activating in response to general fear. Research suggests that
the amygdala is implicated in social avoidance in humans (Hahn
et al., 2011), in discomfort when others invade our personal space
(Kennedy et al., 2009), and keeps track of social value (Adolphs,
2010), an aptitude presumably valuable for tracking competitors.
Together, these studies support the idea that the amygdala plays a
role in competitive avoidance.
Complementing the role played by the amygdala in switching
behavior, was the increased activity in the dorsal putamen when,
based on the decreasing supply rate of R, it was increasingly dis-
advantageous to stay in the habitat (Fig. 3B). Supporting this was
the interindividual differences in the amount of relative weight a
subject assigned towrwc, which again resulted in activity in the
putamen (Fig. 3E). The putamen receives input from the primary
sensory andmotor cortices (McGeorge and Faull, 1989) andme-
diates the interplay between sensorimotor and motivation infor-
mation (Balleine et al., 2007). The general consensus is that the
putamen is also involved in habitual actions, yet may be involved
in simple, possibly Pavlovian cue-controlled reward seeking (Bal-
leine et al., 2007; Zapata, 2010). Indeed, the putamen is involved
in motor readiness and the initiation of actions based on the
Figure 3. Switches based on C or R and individual differences in habitat switching behavior. A, Amygdala activity correlating with switches based on increasing C in the subject’s habitat (HS). B,
Putamen activity associated with switches based on decreasing R in HS. C, Bars represents each subject’s percentage difference between switches based on wc wr. Positive values represent a
weighted preference for Cwhile negative values are indicative of a preference to switches based on R.D, Amygdala activity associatedwith increasing C and increasing R in HS, again supporting the
reasoning that the amygdala is more sensitive to changes inwcwr. E, Conversely, putamen activity associated withwrwc in HS, suggesting that this region is sensitive to changes in R.
Table 5. Parametric changes when it is disadvantageous to stay in the habitat
based on C but not R input
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z value p value
Amygdala 18 6 18 3.05 0.019b
vmPFC 14 62 14 3.81 0.0005
PCC 2 42 26 3.69 0.010b
Parietal cortex 8 68 56 4.29 0.0005a
Cerebellum 0 82 24 4.23 0.0005a
aWhole-brain corrected.
bRegions small volume corrected at p 0.05 FWE with a 8 mm sphere.
Table 6. Parametric changes when it is disadvantageous to stay in the habitat
based on R but not C input
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z value p value
Dorsal putamen 24 14 18 3.15 0.026a
AI 48 4 14 2.97 0.001
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 28 26 32 3.95 0.0005
aRegions small volume corrected at p 0.05 FWE with a 8 mm sphere.
Table 7. Parametric changes in C R input
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z value p value
Amygdala 26 2 26 2.86 0.035b
Lateral parietal cortex 38 68 44 3.49 0.0005
Dorsal temporal lobe 40 22 8 3.44 0.0005
PCC 14 26 40 3.22 0.001a
Middle temporal gyrus 58 40 8 3.09 0.001a
aWhole-brain corrected.
bRegions small volume corrected at p 0.05 FWE with a 8 mm sphere.
Correlation with switching preferences based on C R.
Table 8. Parametric changes in C R input
Region Peak MNI coordinates Z value p value
Dorsal caudate 22 0 18 2.88 0.048b
Ventral tegmental area 14 20 16 2.73 0.003b
dACC 14 36 16 3.15 0.001
Lateral visual cortex 46 84 10 3.76 0.0005a
Globus pallidus 24 12 2 3.17 0.001
Superior temporal sulcus 44 50 6 3.12 0.001
AI 34 28 8 3.39 0.001
aWhole-brain corrected.
bRegions small volume corrected at p 0.05 FWE with a 8 mm sphere. Other coordinates are uncorrected.
Correlation with switching preferences based on R C.
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current reward value, fitting with the notion that the putamen
tracks howactions lead to correct responses (Balleine et al., 2010).
The putamen is also well connected to the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, a region involved in self-control (Hare et al., 2009) and
may interact with the striatum when orienting attention toward
reward (Hikosaka, 2006).
Our findings bridge the fields of social and decision neurosci-
ence and behavioral and computational ecology to demonstrate
that a basic set of neural systems drive subjects to reside in, or
relocate to, profitable habitats. Moreover, we show that the deci-
sion to switch habitats is driven by interindividual preferences
based on social competition or reward-weighted bias. In real
ecologies, input matching is likely to be more complex whereby
despotic individuals occupy quality habitats and predatory threat
drives habitat switching. Here we test the simplest of input-
matching models, yet we set the scene for future studies to exam-
ine a broad range of contexts that influence optimal foraging
behaviors (Gallistel et al., 2001; Gallistel and Gibbon, 2001).
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